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Empirical Article
It is often assumed that science is a self-correcting enter-
prise: The veracity of scientific knowledge should pro-
gressively improve as inaccurate claims are abandoned 
and accurate claims are reinforced (Vazire & Holcombe, 
2020). Replication studies are considered to be a key 
driver of this process because they may indicate that prior 
results are exaggerated or erroneous (Ioannidis, 2012; 
Zwaan et al., 2018). Although interpreting the outcome 
of replication studies is not necessarily straightforward 
(Collins, 1985; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Maxwell et  al., 
2015), one might expect a replication result that strongly 
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Abstract
Replication studies that contradict prior findings may facilitate scientific self-correction by triggering a reappraisal of the 
original studies; however, the research community’s response to replication results has not been studied systematically. 
One approach for gauging responses to replication results is to examine how they affect citations to original studies. 
In this study, we explored postreplication citation patterns in the context of four prominent multilaboratory replication 
attempts published in the field of psychology that strongly contradicted and outweighed prior findings. Generally, 
we observed a small postreplication decline in the number of favorable citations and a small increase in unfavorable 
citations. This indicates only modest corrective effects and implies considerable perpetuation of belief in the original 
findings. Replication results that strongly contradict an original finding do not necessarily nullify its credibility; however, 
one might at least expect the replication results to be acknowledged and explicitly debated in subsequent literature. By 
contrast, we found substantial citation bias: The majority of articles citing the original studies neglected to cite relevant 
replication results. Of those articles that did cite the replication but continued to cite the original study favorably, 
approximately half offered an explicit defense of the original study. Our findings suggest that even replication results 
that strongly contradict original findings do not necessarily prompt a corrective response from the research community.
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contradicts1 and outweighs the results of a prior (“origi-
nal”) study to affect how that study is cited in subsequent 
academic literature. For example, if a replication under-
mines belief in the credibility of an original finding, one 
might expect to see a change in the frequency and 
valence (favorability) of citations to the original study, 
that is, a decrease in favorable citations accompanied by 
an increase in unfavorable citations. However, as dis-
cussed below, a variety of interesting patterns could 
emerge depending on how the research community 
responds to a replication result. The goal of the present 
study was to empirically explore and describe postrep-
lication citation patterns in the context of four prominent 
multilaboratory replication attempts published in the 
field of psychology that strongly contradicted and out-
weighed the findings of prior studies.
Table 1 outlines several citation patterns that might 
follow a contradictory replication result, each reflecting 
different types of response by the research community. 
We have tentatively categorized these response patterns 
as being “progressive” or “regressive,” depending on their 
expected impact on the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge.2 The first set of patterns, belief correction/
perpetuation, refers to what is often considered a primary 
functional role of (contradictory) replication studies—to 
change belief in the credibility of exaggerated or errone-
ous original findings (Ioannidis, 2012; Vazire & Holcombe, 
2020; Zwaan et al., 2018). In the absence of an explicit 
defense of an original study that convincingly explains 
a strongly contradictory replication result (see explicit 
defense explanation below), a progressive response might 
involve a decrease in favorable citations and an increase 
in unfavorable citations, reflecting updated beliefs about 
the credibility of the original finding. Conversely, a regres-
sive response might involve maintenance of (or even 
increase in) favorable citations and relatively few unfavor-
able citations, which suggests a perpetuation of belief in 
the credibility of the original finding despite the contra-
dictory replication result. Prior research has documented 
how favorable citations to observational epidemiology 
studies can persist despite the claims of those studies 
being strongly contradicted in subsequent randomized 
trials (Tatsioni et al., 2007). Likewise, it has been reported 
that even when articles are retracted, they can continue 
to receive favorable citations (Budd et al., 1998; Fernández 
& Vadillo, 2020). Thus, there is evidence that belief in the 
credibility of original findings can perpetuate even when 
subsequent events cast doubt on their credibility; how-
ever, we are unaware of similar evidence in the context 
of studies that were explicitly designed to test the repli-
cability of prior findings.
The second set of patterns in Table 1, citation bal-
ance/bias, generally refers to whether positive (sup-
portive) evidence is preferentially cited relative to 
negative (nonsupportive) evidence (Bastiaansen et al., 
2015; Greenberg, 2009). This pattern has previously 
been observed in the context of research on inclusion 
body myositis; citation content analysis showed that the 
accumulating literature heavily cited the theory that 
beta amyloid is involved, ignoring multiple studies that 
Table 1. Progressive or Regressive Responses to Strongly Contradictory Replication Results and Their Expected Impact on 
Citation Patterns for Original Studies
Progressive responses Regressive responses
Belief correction
A decrease in the number of favorable citations may reflect 
a decline in belief in the credibility of the original finding 
(a belief correction pattern). This may be accompanied by 
a relative increase in the number of unfavorable citations 
(an active belief correction pattern) or relatively fewer/no 
unfavorable citations (a passive belief correction pattern).
Belief perpetuation
A maintenance of or increase in the number of favorable 
citations may reflect a maintenance of or increase in belief 
in the credibility of the original finding (a belief perpetuation 
pattern). This may be accompanied by a relative increase 
in unfavorable citations (a challenged belief perpetuation 
pattern) or relatively fewer/no unfavorable citations (an 
unchallenged belief perpetuation pattern).
Citation balance
Articles that cite the original study may also cite the 
contradictory replication, reflecting that relevant evidence has 
been considered (a balanced citation pattern).
Citation bias
Articles that cite the original study may neglect to also cite the 
contradictory replication, reflecting that relevant evidence 
has been neglected either through lack of awareness or 
deliberate omission (a citation bias pattern).
Explicit defense
Articles that favorably cite the original study and unfavorably 
cite the contradictory replication may offer concrete 
counterarguments that state why the credibility of the 
original finding has not been undermined (an explicit 
defense pattern).
Absent defense
Articles that favorably cite the original study and unfavorably 
cite the contradictory replication may offer no concrete 
counterarguments that state why the credibility of the original 
finding has not been undermined (an absent defense pattern).
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contradicted this theory (Greenberg, 2009). In the pres-
ent study, these patterns specifically refer to whether 
articles citing an original study also cite the subsequent 
contradictory replication study. A progressive response 
would be to cite both studies (citation balance) because 
this involves considering and reporting highly relevant 
evidence (even if the implications of the replication are 
disputed; see explicit defense explanation below). By 
contrast, citation bias could occur if articles citing an 
original study neglect to cite a relevant replication study. 
Regardless of whether this occurs through lack of 
awareness or deliberate omission, it can be considered 
a regressive response pattern because highly relevant 
evidence is not being reported or considered.
The third set of patterns in Table 1, explicit/absent 
defense, refers to whether researchers who continue 
to favorably cite the original finding despite the 
strongly contradictory replication result offer a con-
crete defense of the original study. As implied above, 
even when the results of a replication study strongly 
contradict the results of an original study, this does 
not necessarily nullify the credibility of the original 
findings; the same criticisms that one might apply to 
an original study to infer that its findings are erroneous 
or exaggerated may also be applied to replication stud-
ies (Collins, 1985; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Maxwell 
et al., 2015). Thus, if proponents of the original claim 
mount an explicit defense that counters the implica-
tions of the replication results, this might still be con-
sidered a progressive response (although obviously 
one could disagree with the arguments that are 
presented). By contrast, if favorable citations to the 
original study are not accompanied by explicit argu-
mentation about the replication result (an absent 
defense), this might be considered a regressive 
response because the replication result is apparently 
discounted without providing any rationale.
In the present study, we explored the postreplication 
citation patterns described above in the context of four 
case studies in the field of psychology in which the 
findings of a replication study strongly contradicted and 
outweighed the findings of an original study (Table 2). 
In two of the cases, the replication studies were part of 
a single Many Labs project (Klein et  al., 2014) and 
addressed the “flag priming effect” (T. J. Carter et  al., 
2011) and “money priming effect” (Caruso et al., 2013), 
respectively. The other two cases involved Registered 
Replication Reports (Simons et al., 2014) that examined 
influential demonstrations of the “facial feedback effect” 
(cf. Strack et al., 1988; Wagenmakers et al., 2016) and 
the “ego-depletion effect” (cf. Baumeister et  al., 1998; 
Hagger et al., 2016; Sripada et al., 2014), respectively. 
For methodological reasons (see Hagger et  al., 2016), 
the ego-depletion replication was aimed at a classic 
study in the field (Baumeister et al., 1998) but actually 
employed a modified computer-based version of the 
original paradigm (Sripada et al., 2014). For this particu-
lar case study, we examined citation patterns to both of 
these original studies.
We adopted a case-study approach to develop a “nar-
row and deep” understanding of the topic, as opposed 
to a “broad and shallow” approach, which would have 
required a deliberate representative sampling strategy. We 
chose these particular case studies because they involved 
Table 2. Sample Sizes and Effect Sizes for Replication Studies and Original Studies
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Note: Publication dates are earliest available (i.e., “online first” if relevant). d = Cohen’s d; MD = mean difference; k = number of data-collection 
sites; N = total number of participants; CI = confidence interval.
aTotal citations to the original study between the publication date and December 31, 2019.
bFor methodological reasons (see Hagger et al., 2016), the ego-depletion replication was aimed at a classic study in the field (Baumeister et al., 1998) 
but actually employed a modified computer-based version of the original paradigm (Sripada et al., 2014). We examined postreplication citation 
patterns for both studies.
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prominent preregistered multilaboratory replication 
attempts with sample sizes 23 times to 211 times larger 
than the original studies, thus providing highly visible and 
highly credible evidence that strongly contradicted and 
outweighed earlier findings.3 This facilitates additional 
interpretative clarity about the citation patterns one might 
expect to observe.
The present study was exploratory in nature and 
intended to provide descriptive observations rather than 
test hypotheses. The three sets of expected citation pat-
terns outlined in Table 1 were used to guide our study 
design and interpretation, but we do not claim that this 
is a comprehensive typology of the postreplication 
patterns that may occur. Such patterns may be more 
complex and idiosyncratic in other topic domains. To 
examine belief correction/perpetuation patterns, we 
downloaded citation histories (a list of citing articles) 
for each original study and classified the valence (favor-
able, equivocal, or unfavorable) of a set of prereplica-
tion and postreplication citations. To examine citation 
balance/bias patterns, we manually checked whether 
postreplication citations of the original study were 
accompanied by citations to the replication study. 
Finally, to examine explicit/absent defense patterns, we 
extracted and categorized any counterarguments offered 
in articles that cited the replication.
Method
The study protocol (rationale, methods, and analysis 
plan) was preregistered on April 7, 2018 (https://osf.io/
eh5qd/). An amended protocol was registered partway 
through data collection on May 1, 2019, primarily 
because we extended the sampling frame to cover addi-
tional months (https://osf.io/pdvb5/). All deviations 
from these protocols are explicitly acknowledged in 
Supplementary Information A in the Supplemental Mate-
rial available online. We report how we determined our 
sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and 
all measures in the study.
Design
This was a retrospective observational study consisting 
of four case studies. Primary outcome variables were 
annual citation counts for original studies, citation 
valence (favorable, equivocal, unfavorable), co-citation 
of original and replication studies, and frequency/type 
of counterarguments.
Sample
We examined four case studies in which a prominent 
preregistered and multilaboratory replication study 
strongly contradicted and outweighed the findings of an 
original study (Table 2). As shown, all the original stud-
ies found modestly large to very large effects, and all of 
them were relatively small studies (thus they would have 
been underpowered to detect small effects). Conversely, 
all the replication efforts comprised very large sample 
sizes, and they would be very well powered to detect 
even small effects; however, they all obtained null 
results.
Procedure
Annual citation counts. Citation histories (i.e., biblio-
graphic records for all articles that cite the original study) 
from the publication date of each original study through 
December 31, 2019, were downloaded from Clarivate 
Analytics Web of Science Core Collection, accessed via 
the Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin on August 12, 
2020. We also obtained citation histories for a reference 
class—all articles published in the same journal and the 
same year as each original study—from the same source. 
For example, for Baumeister et al. (1998), the reference 
class was all articles published in 1998 in the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. Citation counts were 
standardized in each case study by setting the citation 
count in the replication year to the standardized value of 
100 and then adjusting the counts in other years accord-
ing to the same transformation ratio. For example, if the 
raw citation count in the replication year was 1,000, cita-
tion counts in each year would be standardized by divid-
ing by 10. This computation was performed separately 
for citations to the reference class and citations to the 
original article.
Qualitative assessment. Qualitative assessment of cita-
tion patterns was limited to a time period starting 1 year 
before the year of publication of the replication study until 
December 31, 2019, excluding the year in which the repli-
cation was published. We excluded the replication year 
because it may be unreasonable to expect citing articles 
already in the publication pipeline to cite the replication 
study. For the Baumeister case, the qualitative analysis was 
based on a random sample of 40% of citing articles from 
the prereplication period and postreplication period 
because of the large number of citations to the original 
study (n = 1,974; for details, see Supplementary Informa-
tion B in the Supplemental Material).
For each citing article undergoing qualitative assess-
ment, we attempted to retrieve the full text via several 
methods in the following order: (a) search of at least 
two of the institutional libraries we are affiliated with; 
(b) general Internet search for the article title, including 
the Google and Google Scholar search engines and 
Research Gate; (c) email requests to the corresponding 
author; and (d) interlibrary loan request. Articles that 
remained inaccessible after all of these methods were 
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exhausted were excluded. Articles written in a non- 
English language were translated by one of the authors 
or by using Google Translate (see Supplementary Infor-
mation D in the Supplemental Material). For articles for 
which we could obtain the full text, we classified the 
research design according to the categories in Table 3 
and recorded whether the replication study was cited 
after manual inspection of the reference section (see 
Table 1: citation balance/bias).
To examine the belief correction/perpetuation pattern 
(Table 1), one of six primary coders (T. E. Hardwicke, 
D. Szűcs, R. T. Thibault, S. Crüwell, O. R. van den Akker, 
and M. B. Nuijten) manually extracted the “citation con-
text” of the original study and the replication study (i.e., 
all relevant verbatim text surrounding each in-text cita-
tion). The primary coder then classified the citation 
valence as “favorable,” “equivocal,” “unfavorable,” or 
“unclassifiable.” Favorable citations were those used to 
support a positive claim about the phenomenon of inter-
est, whereas unfavorable citations were used to support 
a negative claim about the phenomenon of interest. Cita-
tions were considered equivocal if the authors did not 
take a predominantly favorable or unfavorable position. 
Citations that did not endorse or oppose the phenom-
enon of interest (e.g., simply referring to the procedures 
of the original study) were designated as unclassifiable. 
Because this process was inherently subjective, the cita-
tion contexts and classifications were also examined by 
one of six secondary coders (T. E. Hardwicke, D. Szűcs, 
R. T. Thibault, S. Crüwell, O. R. van den Akker, and 
M. B. Nuijten). Disagreements were resolved through 
discussion, and a third coder arbitrated when necessary. 
Valence classifications by the primary coder were modi-
fied after discussion with the secondary coder in 31 
(5%) cases.
To examine the explicit/absent defense pattern (Table 
1), the primary coder flagged articles that co-cited the 
original and replication studies and also contained any 
explicit defense of the original study. Subsequently, two 
team members (O. R. van den Akker and S. Crüwell) 
reexamined all of the flagged cases, extracted verbatim 
counterarguments, and developed a post hoc categoriza-
tion scheme that summarized them as concisely and 
informatively as possible. Coding disagreements were 
resolved through discussion, and a third coder (T. E. 
Hardwicke) arbitrated when necessary.
In additional exploratory (not preregistered) analy-
ses, we examined overlap of authorship for articles that 
provided counterarguments with (a) any of the authors 
of the original studies and (b) any prior collaborators 
of the first authors of the original studies. These analy-
ses are complicated by the fact that author names in 
bibliographic records do not always adhere to the same 
grammatical standards—for example, whether fore-
names are initialized or middle names are included—so 
it is not straightforward to isolate individual authors 
within bibliographic databases. To identify prior col-
laborators of the first authors of the original studies, we 
downloaded bibliographic records (on February 2, 
2021) for all articles published by each of the original 
study first authors according to their author record in 
the Web of Science Core Collection. These author 
records are automatically generated by an algorithm 
that attempts to identify all documents likely published 
by an individual author using several variations of their 
name (e.g., “Hardwicke, Tom E.,” “Hardwicke, Tom,” 
“Hardwicke, T. E.”), but errors can still occur, and 
incomplete database coverage means that this method 
likely misses some of the authors’ prior publications 
and consequently some of their collaborators. Neverthe-
less, the method supports a reasonable lower bound 
estimate of authorship overlap with articles providing 
counterarguments. To identify authorship overlap, we 
used string manipulation tools in R to extract only 
author surnames from bibliographic records and then 
used string matching to automatically detect the pres-
ence of original author or collaborator surnames among 
the surnames of authors of articles that provided coun-
terarguments. When a match was detected, it was veri-
fied by manual examination of the authors’ full names.
Results
In total, 2,829 articles cited one of the original studies, 
of which 632 articles (after taking a 40% random sample 
in the Baumeister case) fell within the time period des-
ignated for qualitative assessment. Of these 632 articles, 
we excluded 28 from the qualitative analysis because 
(a) we could not access the full text (n = 22), (b) they 
included a citation to the original study in the reference 
section but not in the main text (n = 5), or (c) manual 
inspection indicated that they did not actually appear to 
cite the original study at all (n = 1). Article type classi-
fications for the remaining 604 articles included in the 
qualitative analysis are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Counts and Percentages for Article Type 
Classifications of Articles Included in Qualitative Analyses
Article type Count (%)
No empirical data (e.g., editorials, commentaries 
[without reanalysis], simulations, news, and 
reviews)
197 (33)
Data synthesis - meta-analysis 11 (2)
Empirical data - commentary including analysis 4 (1)
Empirical data - case study 1 (< 1)
Empirical data - survey 79 (13)
Empirical data - field study 40 (7)
Empirical data - laboratory study 248 (41)
Empirical data - multiple study types are reported 24 (4)
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Annual citation counts and  
citation valence
Figure 1 shows standardized annual citation counts for 
each original study and the respective reference class 
(citations to all articles published in the same year and 
same journal as the original study) and classifications of 
citation valence (favorable, equivocal, unfavorable, 
unclassifiable, or excluded). The data can also be viewed 
in tabular format in Supplementary Table C1 in the 
Supplemental Material. All counts (n) reported in the 
text and table are raw counts (i.e., not standardized).
After the replication was published, citations to the 
reference classes were continuing their trend to plateau 
(Baumeister case) or increase (other cases). By contrast, 
citations to the original study appeared to undergo a 
modest decline in the Strack case (decreasing from 56 to 
41 between 2015 and 2019) and a small decline followed 
by a small increase in the Baumeister case (increasing 
from 191 to 199 between 2015 and 2019). In the other 












































































































































































































Fig. 1. Standardized annual citation counts (solid line) for the five original studies with citation valence (favorable, equivo-
cal, unfavorable, unclassifiable) illustrated by colored areas in prereplication and postreplication assessment periods. The 
dashed line depicts citations to the reference class (all articles published in the same journal and same year as the target 
article). Annual citation counts are standardized against the year in which the replication was published (citation counts 
in the replication year, indicated by a black arrow, are set at the standardized value of 100). Citation valence classifica-
tions for the Baumeister case are extrapolated to all articles in the assessment period according to a 40% random sample.
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cases (Sripada, Carter, Caruso), the total citation counts 
were much lower, and there was considerable variability 
in the postreplication citation patterns; nevertheless, 
there was no substantial change in annual citations from 
prereplication to postreplication in these three cases (the 
maximum difference was +8 citations).
Before the replication, the vast majority of citations 
were favorable for all five articles (range = 67%–100%). 
In most cases (Strack, Sripada, Carter, and Caruso), there 
was a small postreplication increase in unfavorable cita-
tions and a small decrease in favorable citations, indicat-
ing a modest active correction pattern. However, the 
overall number of unfavorable citations was very low, 
and there was still a substantial majority of favorable 
citations. For example, in the Strack case, unfavorable 
citations increased from 0% in the prereplication period 
(2015) to 7% in the postreplication period, whereas 
favorable citations decreased from 88% to 78%. In the 
Baumeister case, the proportion of favorable citations 
remained stable from prereplication (79%) to postrepli-
cation (77%), a pattern consistent with belief perpetua-
tion. The very small number of unfavorable citations 
(2017: n = 7, 7%; 2018: n = 2, 2%; 2019: n = 2, 4%) sug-
gests that this is largely an unchallenged belief perpetu-
ation pattern (see Table 1).
Citation balance and citation bias
Figure 2 shows the proportion of citing articles that also 
cited or did not cite the replication study after it was 
published (excluding the publication year itself). The 
data can also be viewed in tabular format in Supplemen-
tary Table C1 in the Supplemental Material. In the Strack 
and Baumeister cases, a considerable majority of articles 
citing the original study did not cite the replication study, 
which indicates substantial citation bias. In the Baumeis-
ter case, the proportion of articles citing the replication 
study remained stable (20% in 2017, 18% in 2019). In 
the Strack case, the proportion increased from 13% to 
41%. In the Carter and Caruso cases, the proportion 
never exceeded 50%, also consistent with substantial 
citation bias. In the Sripada case, it was much more 
common for the replication study to be cited (> 88%), 
which reflects a balanced citation pattern.
Explicit defense and absent defense
Table 4 shows whether articles that cited the original 
study and replication study (“co-citing articles”) and the 
subset of co-citing articles that cited the original study 
favorably provided any explicit counterarguments to 
defend the credibility of the original finding (an explicit 
defense) or not (an absent defense). Overall, fewer 
than half of the 127 co-citing articles provided any 
counterarguments. Of the 60 co-citing articles that cited 
the original study favorably, around half provided coun-
terarguments. We identified 58 discrete counterargu-
ments in 51 citing articles (45 of which were unique 
articles because six of them were cited in two of the 
case studies) and allocated them to one of three catego-
ries (Table 5).
In additional exploratory analyses (not preregistered), 
we examined other characteristics of the 45 unique arti-
cles that contained counterarguments. The articles were 
published in 34 individual journals; Frontiers in Psychol-
ogy published seven of the articles, Social Psychology 
published four of the articles, and all other journals 
published only one or two of the articles. Seventeen of 
the articles did not involve empirical data, three involved 
reanalysis or meta-analysis of existing data, and 25 
involved collection of novel data. The articles had 112 
individual authors, of whom all contributed to a single 
article except for nine individuals who had authored or 
coauthored two articles. Three articles were authored or 
coauthered by one of the original authors, and nine 
articles were authored or coauthoredby at least one prior 
collaborator of one of the first authors of the original 
articles. Seven of these articles did not involve empirical 
data, and five of them involved novel data collection.
Citations to replication studies and  
co-citation of original studies
A reviewer requested that we examine citation counts 
for replication studies and check whether citing articles 
also co-cited the relevant original study. To obtain the 
data, we downloaded bibliographic records from the 
Clarivate Analytics Web of Science Core Collection, 
accessed via the University of Amsterdam on April 16, 
2021, for articles that cited each replication study (up to 
the study endpoint—December 2019) and cross-checked 
them with our sample of articles that cited the original 
study. As shown in Table 6, the replication studies also 
have a life of their own, and they are often cited inde-
pendently of the specific original study. Often this is 
easy to explain. For example, Klein et al. replicated 13 
original studies, not just the two that were of interest in 
our analysis. These studies are also likely to have accrued 
citations by virtue of being among the first highly promi-
nent examples of preregistered multilaboratory replica-
tions in psychology.
Discussion
It has been proposed that replication studies can facilitate 
scientific self-correction by modifying scientists’ belief in 
the credibility of published findings (Ioannidis, 2012; 
Vazire & Holcombe, 2020; Zwaan et al., 2018); however, 
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the extent to which this occurs in practice is unclear. In 
this study, we investigated how the research community 
responded to four strongly contradictory replications in 
the field of psychology by examining postreplication cita-
tion patterns for original studies. We observed some pro-
gressive response patterns in the form of modest active 
correction (a small decline in favorable citations and a 
small increase in unfavorable citations) and even more 
prominent regressive response patterns in the form of 
unchallenged belief perpetuation (sustained levels 
of favorable citations and few unfavorable citations, 
particularly in the Baumeister case) and considerable 
citation bias (neglecting to cite the replication study; in 
all cases aside from Sripada). When authors cited the 
original study favorably despite the replication result, 
only half of the articles provided any explicit counterar-
guments in defense of the original study (an explicit 
defense). Overall, these findings are consistent with prior 
observations that favorable citation patterns appear rela-
tively unperturbed by subsequent publication of contra-
dictory results in studies with lower risk of bias (Tatsioni 
et al., 2007) or even by full retraction (Budd et al., 1998; 




































































































Fig. 2. Standardized annual citation counts (solid line) for the five original studies with citation balance/bias (i.e., whether the replication is 
cited) illustrated by colored areas in the postreplication assessment period. The dashed line depicts citations to the reference class (all articles 
published in the same journal and same year as the target article). Annual citation counts are standardized against the year in which the repli-
cation was published (citation counts in the replication year, indicated by a black arrow, are set at the standardized value of 100). Replication 
citation proportions for the Baumeister case are extrapolated to all articles in the assessment period according to a 40% random sample.
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Fernández & Vadillo, 2020) and that positive (supportive) 
evidence is preferentially cited relative to negative (non-
supportive) evidence once a theory gets entrenched 
despite overwhelming evidence against it (Bastiaansen 
et al., 2015; Greenberg, 2009).
It is reasonable to question whether the replication 
results in these case studies should (rationally) have insti-
gated belief change in the research community and thus 
triggered a more sizable decline in favorable citations 
than we observed. Note that the case studies we selected 
were deliberately chosen because the replication results 
were superior to the original results in terms of both 
credibility and evidential value. The replications were 
preregistered, multilaboratory studies with large sample 
sizes. By contrast, the original studies had much smaller 
sample sizes and arguably had a much higher risk of bias 
given that they were not preregistered, were performed 
by single teams, and arose in domains affected by pub-
lication bias and other questionable research practices 
(E. C. Carter et al., 2015; Coles et al., 2019; Vadillo, 2019; 
Vadillo et al., 2016). Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the compelling replication results should have 
reduced belief in the credibility of the original results. 
However, one could also contend that if there were some 
flaw in the replication study that undermined its validity 
(Brandt et al., 2014; Fabrigar et al., 2020; Vazire et al., 
2021), then this may provide justification to continue 
favorably citing the original study. Indeed, in these par-
ticular case studies, the validity of the replication results 
has been challenged by proponents of the original find-
ings (Table 5; Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Strack, 2016). 
Because this debate remains far from settled (Coles et al., 
2019; Vadillo, 2019), ideally any favorable citation of the 
original studies should at a minimum be accompanied 
by co-citation of the replication results and some discus-
sion of the discrepant findings.
The clear evidence of citation bias that our study 
documents may have two main contributory factors: (a) 
a lack of awareness about the replication results and/or 
(b) a decision to ignore the replication results. The prac-
tical issue of awareness is not necessarily straightforward 
to address. Individual scientists can find it difficult to 
keep up to date with the voluminous literature that is 
Table 4. Counts and Percentages for Whether Articles 
That Cited Both the Original Study and Replication Study 
Provided Any Explicit Argumentation to Defend the Original 
Study
Case
Did co-citing articles provide argumentation 




No Yes No Yes
Baumeister 24 (56%) 19 (44%) 11 (46%) 13 (54%)
Carter 11 (79%)  3 (21%)  3 (75%)  1 (25%)
Caruso  8 (67%)  4 (33%)  1 (50%)  1 (50%)
Sripada 10 (53%)  9 (47%)  2 (40%)  3 (60%)
Strack 23 (59%) 16 (41%) 12 (48%) 13 (52%)
All cases 76 (60%) 51 (40%) 29 (48%) 31 (52%)
Note: Data are displayed for co-citing articles with any citation valence 
classification and the subset of co-citing articles with favorable citation 
valence classifications.
Table 5. Categorization of Counterarguments Provided to Defend the Original Study in Light 
of the Contradictory Replication Result




Methodological features of the replication study or other 
moderating factors may explain the absence of an effect.
Example: “Ego depletion exists but its occurrence seems to 
depend on moderating conditions. Therefore, we think that 
the search of moderators concerning ego depletion (or ego 
depletion as a moderator, respectively) is justified” (Kühl & 




Evidence from other studies supports the existence of the effect.
Example: “Although there has been a challenge to this original 
finding, there have been many replications of the principle 
and a meta-analysis shows a robust facial-feedback effect” 
(Lewis, 2018, p. 2).
11
Expertise Inadequate expertise of the replicating authors explains why 
they could not replicate the effect.
Example: “In other words, it is easier to be successful at non-
replications while it takes expertise and diligence to generate 
a new result in a reliable fashion” (Strack, 2017, p. 3).
 2
Note: Fifty-eight discrete counterarguments were identified in 51 articles (45 unique articles across cases).
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relevant to their research. Recently, the reference man-
ager Zotero introduced a feature that alerts users when 
an article in its database has been retracted (Zotero, 
2019). One could imagine a similar feature being intro-
duced for replication studies, perhaps based on data-
bases that explicitly identify replication studies. However, 
it is much less straightforward to define and identify a 
relevant replication study (Neuliep & Crandall, 1993), 
and users would need to be alerted that this requires 
some scientific judgment rather than simple article meta-
data. Another solution could be to encourage research-
ers to focus less on individual studies and more on 
up-to-date evidence summaries (i.e., reviews and meta-
analyses) in which relevant evidence is systematically 
identified and collated. This would require that high-
quality and contemporary evidence summaries are avail-
able; however, in psychology, systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses can be of low quality, and their results 
may still be inflated and nonreproducible (Kvarven et al., 
2020; Maassen et al., 2020; Polanin et al., 2020). More-
over, empirical studies are often not included in any 
form of evidence synthesis (Hardwicke et al., 2021).
The second issue of authors ignoring highly relevant 
replications seems undesirable and implies a biased 
appraisal or presentation of the evidence. Contradictory 
replication results do not necessarily nullify the credibility 
of an original study (Collins, 1985; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; 
Maxwell et al., 2015), but we would still expect highly 
relevant replication results to be cited and explicitly 
debated. In fact, we found that when authors continued 
to favorably cite original studies despite the replication 
results, around half did not provide explicit counterargu-
ments in defense of the original study. Although our study 
did not examine researchers’ individual beliefs, one recent 
study reported that when research psychologists were 
confronted with replication evidence, they often did update 
their (self-reported) beliefs, albeit modestly (McDiarmid 
et al., 2021). However, there are several reasons to be 
uncertain about whether the results from this artificial 
setting might generalize to real-world settings, including 
potential participant reactivity (i.e., participants behaving 
differently because they are under observation and/or 
responding to the perceived expectations of the research 
team) and the possibility that individuals may behave 
differently in settings in which they have substantial per-
sonal investment and may be publicly scrutinized. In addi-
tion, cognitive psychology studies have obtained some 
evidence of a “continued influence effect” wherein an 
individual’s beliefs and behavior can continue to be influ-
enced by false or misleading information despite subse-
quent efforts to reject it (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). It is 
plausible that various cognitive biases, such as confirma-
tion bias (preferentially seeking out and processing evi-
dence that supports preexisting beliefs) or motivated 
reasoning (constructing and evaluating arguments accord-
ing to what is desirable rather than what is rationally 
justifiable), may partly explain researchers’ tendency to 
ignore or dismiss the replication evidence (Bishop, 2019; 
Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998).
We observed that when counterarguments were 
raised, most of them tried to dismiss the contradictory 
replication by claiming that the original and the replica-
tion studies differed in important ways that moderated 
the absence/presence of the effect under investigation. 
In some cases, authors pointed to evidence from other 
studies as a rationale for their continued belief in the 
effect. In a minority of cases, the authors challenged the 
competence of replicators. We found that articles pre-
senting counterarguments were published in a variety 
of journals (rather than clustered in a few journals) and 
involved collection of new data in around half of the 
cases. They were also published by a sizable group of 
investigators, only a minority of whom were one of the 
original authors or had previously collaborated with one 
of the original first authors. This suggests that the explicit 
defense of the original study came from a variety of 
sources rather than being confined to a small number 
of investigators. However, note that this analysis may 
underestimate authorship overlap because of the diffi-
culties isolating individual researcher identities (see 
Method section) and articles published in the same year 
as the replication not being included.
The findings presented here are inherently limited by 
the observational nature of the study design, which com-
plicates straightforward conclusions about the causal 
impact of the replications. Although the use of a refer-
ence class enables us to detect the influence of exoge-
nous factors to some extent, we cannot rule out their 
contribution. For example, the modest decline in favor-
able citations observed in most cases could be attribut-
able, at least in part, to a more general awareness in the 
research community about methodological issues (e.g., 
that the sample sizes of the original studies may not have 
provided adequate statistical power). We have also 
focused only on the replication study and the original 
study in each case study without considering the impact 
Table 6. Citations Counts for Replication Studies and 




Co-citations of original 
study
Hagger et al. (2016) 258 136 (Baumeister et al., 
1998)
22 (Sripada et al., 2014)
Klein et al. (2014) 316 15 (T. J. Carter et al., 
2011)
12 (Caruso et al., 2013)
Wagenmakers  
et al. (2016)
80 36 (Strack et al., 1988)
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of other potentially relevant events. Note that metare-
search studies have detected signatures of publication 
bias and other questionable research practices in the 
fields to which these case studies belong (E. C. Carter 
et  al., 2015; Coles et  al., 2019; Vadillo, 2019; Vadillo 
et al., 2016), and other relevant replication studies con-
testing prior findings have been published (e.g., Rohrer 
et al., 2015).
We have been able to gauge reactions to replications 
only to the extent that they are reflected in relatively 
short-term citation patterns. A potential explanation of 
the apparently cursory treatment of the replication studies 
could be that researchers became aware of them only 
after their own research projects had begun and/or even 
had been completed. If one of the original studies had 
been a key motivator for one’s own study, then it may be 
difficult to accommodate the strongly contradictory rep-
lication results. It may even be tempting to ignore them 
or give them only superficial treatment. Moreover, 
researchers who are convinced that the replication study 
has squarely refuted the original may no longer be inter-
ested in doing research on a topic for which they see no 
future potential. In addition, examination of citation pat-
terns would not detect whether there had been a correc-
tion effect among individuals who would not typically 
cite the original study, such as students, members of the 
public, or researchers working in other fields. A contested 
study may continue to be cited favorably by its propo-
nents who remain working in the field. This will suffice 
to create belief perpetuation in the published literature 
even though other scientists may simply no longer be 
interested in getting involved with such a strongly con-
tested research topic. Relatedly, we did not examine cita-
tion patterns beyond 3 to 5 years after replication. Some 
perspectives envision scientific self-correction unfolding 
over a much longer time scale (Lauden, 1981; Peterson & 
Panofsky, 2020) and suggest that the process is character-
ized less by the impact of individual study results and 
more by the gradual accumulation of converging evi-
dence, gradual revision of theoretical understanding, and/
or informal sociological processes (e.g., researchers 
choosing alternative topics to study). Thus, although the 
current findings may contradict the expectations of a 
more direct and expedited view of the corrective impact 
of replication studies (Ioannidis, 2012; Vazire & Holcombe, 
2020), they are not necessarily inconsistent with a slower 
and more indirect process of self-correction. Future 
research could employ longitudinal designs or older his-
torical case studies to evaluate citation patterns unfolding 
over a longer time scale. Finally, because we examined 
only citation patterns, this study could not capture other 
potential responses to replication results, such as changes 
in research practices.
Generalization beyond these four case studies requires 
caution. Note that the replication studies examined here 
were some of the first large-scale, multilaboratory rep-
lication attempts conducted in the field of psychology. 
This gave them particular prominence and initiated con-
siderable debate, which resulted in broader ramifications 
beyond the research community that typically studies 
the topics under scrutiny (Nelson et al., 2018). Also note 
that we deliberately selected case studies in which the 
replication studies were high-profile and had yielded 
high credibility evidence that strongly contradicted and 
outweighed the original findings. A correction effect may 
be less expected in cases in which replication results 
are more ambiguous, less consequential, or less well 
known. For example, in a situation in which two high-
credibility studies with similar evidential value yield 
contradictory results, it would be premature to lose con-
fidence in one of the studies before further investigation 
has probed the cause of the discrepancy. Pursuit of 
potential moderating factors may be entirely rational in 
such circumstances (Gershman, 2019).
We also note that particular aspects of our study were 
inherently subjective, specifically, the identification of 
citation context, the classification of citation valence, 
and the identification, extraction, and categorization of 
counterarguments. To minimize subjectivity, a team of 
six investigators performed coding in duplicate, with a 
third investigator arbitrating if necessary. Because dis-
agreements between primary and secondary coders were 
infrequent, we are confident that the classifications are 
meaningful, but there may be some edge cases when an 
independent observer might reasonably disagree with 
our classifications.
In conclusion, postreplication citation patterns in four 
case studies indicated that the anticipated corrective 
impact of strongly contradictory replication results did 
not materialize to any substantive degree. A lack of 
awareness of replications and/or a decision to discount 
or omit them appears to have played a significant role. 
This highlights potential practical problems with the 
discoverability of replication studies and psychological 
or sociological issues related to belief change. The find-
ings also indicate that scientific self-correction may not 
be as expedient or straightforward as one might hope 
(Ioannidis, 2012), which adds further impetus toward 
efforts to improve the quality of the academic literature 
(Hardwicke et al., 2020; Nelson et al., 2018).
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Notes
1. Determining whether a replication finding contradicts an origi-
nal finding is a complex issue that we largely sidestep here by 
examining only cases that are strongly contradictory—that is, 
according to several reasonable quantitative criteria (e.g., effect 
size magnitude, p values, Bayes’s factors), the results of the origi-
nal study and replication study lead to opposing inferences (e.g., 
absence vs. presence of an effect). Also note that one can accept 
that results are strongly contradictory and remain agnostic about 
the explanation for the contradiction.
2. This terminology was inspired by but does not directly mirror 
terminology proposed by Imre Lakatos in his work on the ratio-
nality of the research community’s response when a scientific 
theory is contracted by empirical evidence (Lakatos, 1970).
3. We deliberately focused on a select group of case studies 
rather than other potentially larger samples to aid interpretative 
clarity; for example, the extent to which the results of the large-
scale Reproducibility Project in Psychology (RPP; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015) actually contradicted the original studies 
has been contested (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016). In addi-
tion, original studies were not actually cited in the RPP research 
report, which may have diluted awareness about relevant repli-
cation studies.
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